



DISEC



*Addressing the growing threat of
autonomous maritime weapons and
attacks on global shipping.*

BACKGROUND GUIDE

M.C.T.M MUN 2026



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Letter from the Executive Board

Dear delegates,

It is our great honour to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). As your Executive Board, we are looking forward to a session marked by rigorous research, sharp diplomacy, and workable solutions.

This year's agenda, "Addressing the Growing Threat of Autonomous Maritime Weapons and Attacks on Global Shipping," sits at the intersection of two forces reshaping modern conflict: the rapid militarisation of uncrewed technology, and the fragility of the sea lanes that carry roughly 80% of world trade by volume. In the last four years alone, uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have sunk warships in the Black Sea, explosive drone boats have sunk commercial carriers in the Red Sea, and vessels suspected of deliberate sabotage have severed undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. Autonomous weapons that were experimental a decade ago are now operational, cheap, difficult to attribute, and being used against both military and civilian targets.

This is not a hypothetical threat for committee to speculate about — it is an ongoing crisis with a measurable human and economic toll: seafarers killed and taken hostage, insurance premiums for merchant shipping driven sharply upward, cargo re-routed thousands of kilometres around the Cape of Good Hope, and critical undersea infrastructure left exposed. At the same time, the international legal architecture governing the sea — built for crewed warships and merchant vessels — is still catching up: the International Maritime Organization only adopted its first non-mandatory safety code for autonomous ships in 2026, and multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons remain without a binding outcome.

We expect delegates to represent their assigned country's actual position, capabilities, and interests — whether that is a state investing heavily in autonomous naval systems, a flag state whose merchant fleet is being targeted, a coastal state defending critical undersea infrastructure, or a state pushing for a new international treaty. We encourage you to think beyond condemnation and toward concrete, enforceable mechanisms: attribution and accountability regimes, safe-passage and de-confliction arrangements, rules for autonomous systems under the law of armed conflict, and support for affected seafarers and shipping economies.

Please come prepared, come having read beyond this guide, and come ready to negotiate in good faith.

Warm regards,

The Executive Board,

Aarna Karnani (Chairperson)

Uddhav Gurumoorthy (Vice-Chairperson)

Rithvik Anand (Moderator)

AGENDA: *Addressing the growing threat of autonomous maritime weapons and attacks on global shipping*



Introduction

Global trade depends overwhelmingly on the sea. More than 80% of world merchandise trade by volume, and over 70% by value, is carried by ships, moving through a small number of critical chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez and Panama Canals, and the Turkish Straits. Any disruption to these routes has an immediate, global economic effect: rerouted vessels, higher freight and insurance costs, delayed cargo, and knock-on price increases for food, fuel, and consumer goods.

Over the past four years, that dependence has become a strategic vulnerability, because the weapons capable of threatening shipping have changed. Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), sea mines, loitering munitions, and ‘shadow fleet’ vessels used for deliberate sabotage are cheap, difficult to attribute, and can be deployed by both states and non-state actors with limited naval capacity. Ukraine has used small, explosive-laden USVs to sink or disable a significant share of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet without possessing a comparable conventional navy. The Houthi movement in Yemen, a non-state armed group with no navy at all, has used waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs) and aerial drones to sink commercial vessels, kill and kidnap seafarers, and force a large share of Suez-bound traffic to divert around Africa. In the Baltic Sea, vessels suspected of belonging to Russia’s sanctions-evading tanker ‘shadow fleet’ have repeatedly been implicated in the severing of undersea power and data cables. In June 2026, the United States used autonomous Corsair USVs in direct combat for the first time, striking an Iranian naval facility near the Strait of Hormuz.

This proliferation has outpaced the law. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was drafted for crewed vessels and does not clearly define whether an autonomous or remotely-operated vessel qualifies as a ‘ship’ or a ‘warship’, which affects questions of immunity, right of innocent passage, and state responsibility. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) only adopted its first international safety code for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (the MASS Code) in May 2026, and it remains non-mandatory until at least 2028–2032. Talks on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) have continued for over a decade without producing a binding treaty, despite a 2024 UN General Assembly resolution calling for one.

DISEC’s task is to examine how the international community can respond to attacks on shipping and maritime infrastructure carried out using autonomous or remotely-piloted systems — by both state and non-state actors — and to propose frameworks that improve accountability, protect civilian seafarers and commerce, and begin to close the legal gaps that current conflicts have exposed.

Key Terms

1. **Autonomous Maritime Weapon:** Any waterborne or underwater system capable of navigating and/or engaging a target with reduced or no real-time human control, including uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed underwater vehicles, and autonomous or semi-autonomous mines and loitering munitions.
2. **Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS):** The IMO’s official term for a ship which, to a varying degree, can operate independently of human interaction — ranging from partial automation with seafarers aboard to fully autonomous, remotely controlled operation with no crew.



3. **Uncrewed Surface Vessel (USV):** A remotely piloted or autonomous surface craft, often small and low-cost, that can be armed with explosives and used as a one-way attack (kamikaze) or reusable platform. Examples include Ukraine's Magura V5 and Sea Baby, and Houthis WBIEDs.
4. **Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (UUV):** A submersible drone used for reconnaissance, mine-countermeasures, or, in extra-large variants such as the US Navy's Orca XLUUV, strike missions, without an onboard crew.
5. **Waterborne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED):** Term used by naval and maritime-security analysts for small, explosive-laden boats — often remotely piloted — used by non-state actors such as the Houthis as a low-cost anti-ship weapon.
6. **Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS):** A weapons system that can select and engage targets without further human intervention once activated. LAWS are the subject of ongoing multilateral talks under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
7. **Shadow Fleet:** A term for aging tankers and cargo vessels, often flagged in third countries and operating with obscured ownership, used by sanctioned states to move oil and goods while evading sanctions.
8. **Freedom of Navigation:** The principle under customary international law and UNCLOS that vessels of all states may navigate the high seas, and exercise innocent passage through territorial waters, without interference.
9. **UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982):** The primary treaty governing rights and responsibilities of states in the world's oceans, including territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, the high seas, and the legal status of warships.
10. **IMO (International Maritime Organization):** The UN specialized agency responsible for the safety, security, and environmental performance of international shipping, and the body developing the MASS Code for autonomous ships.
11. **Attribution:** The process of reliably identifying the state or actor responsible for an attack or act of sabotage — a persistent difficulty with autonomous and remotely operated systems, and with flag-of-convenience 'shadow fleet' vessels.
12. **Maritime Chokepoint:** A narrow, strategically vital shipping route — such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, or the Strait of Malacca — through which a large share of global trade or energy supplies must pass, making it a high-value target for disruption.

Background Information

1. The Changing Character of Maritime Warfare

For most of the twentieth century, sea denial and control depended on crewed warships, submarines, and static minefields. That calculus has shifted. Autonomous and remotely piloted maritime systems are now cheap enough for state and non-state actors with limited budgets to acquire meaningful strike capability against much larger, better-funded navies and civilian shipping fleets. A single Ukrainian Sea Baby USV, reportedly costing a fraction of the price of the ships it has sunk or disabled, can be built quickly, launched from shore, and piloted remotely over hundreds of kilometres while carrying up to roughly 2,000 kilograms of explosives. This asymmetry has



already changed the balance of naval power in at least one active conflict, and defence planners in the United States, China, Japan, and elsewhere are racing to develop their own systems.

2. Case Study — Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet

Although Russia's 2022 invasion effectively destroyed Ukraine's conventional navy, Ukraine has used domestically produced USVs — principally the Magura V5 and the Sea Baby — to sink or damage a substantial portion of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, including the missile corvette Ivanovets, the landing ship Caesar Kunikov, and the patrol ship Sergey Kotov. These strikes forced Russia to relocate much of its fleet away from Sevastopol and were a major factor in reopening a functional Black Sea grain export corridor after Russia's blockade. In October 2025, Ukrainian officials unveiled an upgraded Sea Baby with a range of roughly 1,500 kilometres and a payload of around 2,000 kilograms, and Ukrainian manufacturer UFORCE has since partnered with a US defence contractor to build further vessels, signalling that Ukraine's uncrewed-vessel doctrine is becoming an exportable model rather than a one-off wartime improvisation. Russia has responded by describing Ukrainian strikes on commercial and third-country shipping — rather than purely military targets — as acts of "international terrorism."

3. Case Study — Houthi Attacks on Red Sea Shipping

Since November 2023, the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, which controls much of Yemen but is recognised by no state as its government, has attacked commercial and naval vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, initially framing the campaign as solidarity with Gaza. The Houthis were the first actor to use kamikaze USVs operationally, striking a Saudi frigate as early as January 2017. Since 2023 they have combined missiles, aerial drones, small-boat swarms, limpet mines, and explosive USVs — often referred to by analysts as WBIEDs — in more than 70 recorded attacks. Notable incidents include the June 2024 sinking of the bulk carrier Tutor, the first vessel loss involving a USV strike in the campaign, and the July 2025 sinking of both the Magic Seas and the Eternity C within days of one another, the latter killing multiple seafarers and resulting in the kidnapping of survivors. The campaign has forced many shipping lines to avoid the Suez Canal entirely in favour of the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, sharply raising transit times, fuel costs, and war-risk insurance premiums, with consequences for global supply chains and inflation.

The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 2722 (January 2024), condemning the attacks and demanding they cease, adopted 11-0 with China, Russia, Algeria, and Mozambique abstaining. The resolution has since been renewed and updated by further resolutions — 2768 and 2787 of 2025 — which extend monthly reporting requirements and note the increasing sophistication of the weapons involved, but none of these resolutions has been backed by binding enforcement measures against the Houthis or their external suppliers.

4. Case Study — the Baltic Sea 'Shadow Fleet' and Undersea Infrastructure

Since October 2023, a series of incidents in the Baltic Sea have damaged undersea power cables, telecommunications cables, and a gas pipeline connecting Finland, Estonia, Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Germany. Investigators have repeatedly linked the damage to vessels dragging their anchors for extended distances — behaviour considered unlikely to be accidental. The December 2024 seizure of the tanker Eagle S by Finland, after it was suspected of severing the Estlink 2 power cable and four data cables, became the most



prominent case; a Finnish court dismissed charges against its crew in October 2025 for lack of proven intent, illustrating how difficult it is to prosecute deliberate sabotage carried out through what can be presented as ordinary navigational negligence. Further incidents, including the seizure of the vessel *Fitburg* in December 2025, prompted NATO to launch the Baltic Sentry mission in January 2025, deploying frigates, patrol aircraft, and naval drones to monitor and deter further sabotage. While these are not autonomous-weapon attacks in the strict sense, they illustrate the same underlying problem the agenda addresses: low-cost, hard-to-attribute maritime assets being used to inflict strategic damage below the threshold of open war, exploiting gaps in maritime law and attribution.

5. Case Study — the Strait of Hormuz and State Use of Autonomous Strike Systems

In June 2026, during an escalation between Israel, Iran, and the United States, US Central Command employed three autonomous Corsair uncrewed surface vessels, built by the US company Saronic, to strike an Iranian naval facility near the Strait of Hormuz. US officials described it as the first operational combat use of American autonomous surface vessels, following an earlier, non-combat use of a USV to assist in the rescue of a downed helicopter crew. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption, and any prolonged disruption — whether from mines, autonomous strikes, or state retaliation — carries global economic consequences. The episode marked a shift from autonomous maritime weapons being used primarily by weaker or non-state actors to their adoption in direct combat by a major naval power, raising the prospect of an accelerating arms race in maritime autonomy among leading naval states, including China and Russia.

6. Legal and Regulatory Gaps

International law has struggled to keep pace with these developments in several specific ways:

- **Undefined legal status:** UNCLOS does not clearly specify whether an autonomous or remotely operated vessel qualifies as a ‘ship’ or a ‘warship’, which affects sovereign immunity, the right of innocent passage, and which state bears legal responsibility for its conduct.
- **A non-binding safety code:** The IMO adopted its first International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (the MASS Code) in May 2026, in force from July 2026, but it is non-mandatory, applies mainly to commercial cargo vessels rather than weapons systems, and a binding version is not expected before 2028–2032.
- **Stalled talks on lethal autonomy:** The CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS has met for over a decade without producing a binding instrument; a 2024 UN General Assembly resolution called for a legally binding instrument by 2026, but consensus-based CCW procedures allow any single state to block progress.
- **Attribution and accountability gaps:** Autonomous and remotely piloted systems, along with flag-of-convenience ‘shadow fleet’ vessels, make it difficult to prove state responsibility beyond reasonable doubt — as illustrated by the failed *Eagle S* prosecution — which in turn limits the options available for lawful countermeasures or sanctions.
- **Enforcement without teeth:** UN Security Council resolutions on Red Sea shipping have condemned attacks and required reporting, but have not authorised binding enforcement action against the Houthis or the states or networks that supply them with weapons.



7. Economic and Humanitarian Impact

The consequences extend well beyond the vessels directly targeted. Shipping companies have rerouted large volumes of Asia-Europe trade around the Cape of Good Hope rather than through the Suez Canal and Red Sea, adding roughly two weeks to transit times and materially raising fuel consumption, freight rates, and war-risk insurance premiums, with downstream effects on the cost of goods worldwide. Seafarers — who are rarely combatants and typically hold no stake in the underlying political conflicts — have been killed, injured, and taken hostage in Red Sea attacks. Coastal and archipelagic states dependent on undersea cables for electricity and internet connectivity, such as the Baltic states, face the risk of prolonged blackouts or communications disruption from a single act of sabotage. Because autonomous systems reduce the political and personnel cost of attacking shipping, they lower the threshold for actors — state and non-state alike — to target commerce as a tool of coercion, a dynamic this committee must address.

Timeline

Date	Event
1982	UNCLOS is adopted, establishing the core legal regime governing warships, freedom of navigation, and the high seas — the framework autonomous vessels must now be fitted into.
2014–2015	Houthi forces seize Yemen’s capital Sana’a, beginning the civil war that draws in the Saudi-led coalition and sets the stage for later Houthi maritime attacks.
Jan 2017	First documented operational use of a kamikaze uncrewed surface vessel (USV): a Houthi explosive boat strikes a Saudi frigate off Hodeidah, killing two sailors.
Feb 2022	Russia launches its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s conventional navy is largely destroyed within weeks, pushing Kyiv toward asymmetric uncrewed platforms.
Oct 2022	Ukraine uses early USVs, precursors to the Sea Baby, in an attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol — an early proof of concept for uncrewed naval warfare.
Oct 2023	A Chinese-flagged vessel drags its anchor across the Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecom cables between Finland and Estonia, the first in a string of suspected Baltic Sea ‘shadow fleet’ incidents.
Nov 2023	Houthi forces board and seize the cargo ship Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea, opening a campaign of attacks on commercial shipping framed as solidarity with Gaza.
Dec 2023	The US launches the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian; Houthi attacks on the container ship Maersk Hangzhou trigger direct US naval intervention.
10 Jan 2024	UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2722, condemning Houthi attacks and demanding they cease; adopted 11-0 with China, Russia, Algeria and Mozambique abstaining.
11 Jan 2024	The US and UK launch Operation Poseidon Archer, striking Houthi military infrastructure in Yemen.
2023–2024	Ukraine’s Magura V5 and Sea Baby USVs sink or damage numerous Russian warships, including the corvette Ivanovets, the landing ship Caesar Kunikov and the patrol ship Sergey Kotov, forcing the Black Sea Fleet to relocate from Sevastopol.
12 Jun 2024	The bulk carrier Tutor is struck by a Houthi explosive USV and later sinks after further missile strikes — the first confirmed sinking involving a USV in the Red Sea campaign.
Dec 2024	The tanker Eagle S, linked to Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, is seized by Finland on suspicion of severing the



Date	Event
	Estlink 2 power cable and several data cables in the Gulf of Finland by dragging its anchor.
14 Jan 2025	NATO launches the Baltic Sentry mission, deploying frigates, patrol aircraft and naval drones to protect undersea infrastructure after the string of Baltic cable-cutting incidents.
Jul 2025	Houthi forces sink the bulk carriers Magic Seas and Eternity C within days of one another using coordinated small-boat, missile and limpet-mine attacks, killing multiple seafarers and taking survivors hostage.
2025	The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, operating under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), continues talks toward a binding instrument, against a mandate expiring at the 2026 CCW Review Conference.
Oct 2025	A Finnish court dismisses charges against the Eagle S captain and crew, ruling prosecutors failed to prove intent — exposing how difficult it is to prosecute anchor-drag sabotage.
Dec 2025 – Jan 2026	Further suspected shadow-fleet sabotage in the Baltic (the Fitburg case) prompts renewed NATO patrols and a Finnish vessel seizure.
May 2026	The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 111) adopts the first global, non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS Code); a mandatory Code is targeted for 2028–2032.
Jun 2026	Amid Israel–Iran escalation, the US employs three autonomous Corsair USVs, built by Saronic, in a strike on an Iranian naval facility near the Strait of Hormuz — the first US combat use of autonomous surface vessels.
1 Jul 2026	The non-mandatory MASS Code enters into force, applying to cargo ships using autonomous or remote-control technology.
2026 (ongoing)	Russia continues to describe Ukrainian USV strikes on civilian and third-country commercial shipping as 'international terrorism'; the UN Security Council continues to renew monthly-reporting resolutions on Houthi Red Sea attacks (Resolutions 2768 and 2787).

Major Countries and Organisations Involved

- Ukraine** — Has become the world's leading practical developer and user of naval USVs (Magura V5, Sea Baby), using them to offset the destruction of its conventional navy and to break Russia's Black Sea blockade. Increasingly exports its doctrine and technology through partnerships with foreign defence firms.
- Russia** — Target of Ukrainian USV strikes on its Black Sea Fleet and, separately, accused by NATO states of using 'shadow fleet' vessels to sabotage Baltic Sea undersea cables while denying involvement. Frames Ukrainian strikes on commercial and third-country vessels as terrorism and has abstained on UN Security Council resolutions concerning Houthi Red Sea attacks.
- Iran and the Houthi Movement (Yemen)** — Iran is widely accused of supplying the Houthis with missile, drone, and USV technology. The Houthis, a non-state armed group controlling much of Yemen, have used explosive USVs and coordinated small-boat attacks to sink and seize commercial vessels in the Red Sea, taking on a state-like role in disrupting global shipping despite possessing no conventional navy.



4. **United States** — Leads Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer to protect Red Sea shipping and strike Houthi targets; in June 2026 became the first state to use autonomous USVs (Corsair) in direct combat, striking Iranian naval infrastructure near the Strait of Hormuz. Also investing heavily in uncrewed underwater vehicles, such as the Orca XLUV, and has created dedicated Navy offices for robotic and autonomous systems.
5. **China** — Investing heavily in maritime autonomy for use in contested waters, including the South China Sea and around Taiwan; a Chinese-flagged vessel was implicated in an October 2023 Baltic cable-damage incident. Has abstained on UN Security Council resolutions on Red Sea shipping, expressing concern that the issue is being used to justify military action.
6. **NATO and the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany)** — Have experienced repeated suspected sabotage of undersea power and telecommunications cables, prompting the January 2025 launch of NATO's Baltic Sentry mission (frigates, patrol aircraft, and naval drones) and multiple vessel seizures, though prosecutions have struggled to prove intent.
7. **International Maritime Organization (IMO)** — The UN specialized agency responsible for shipping safety and regulation; completed a Regulatory Scoping Exercise on autonomous ships (2018–2021) and adopted the first non-mandatory MASS Code in May 2026, with a mandatory code targeted for the early 2030s.
8. **United Nations Security Council** — Has adopted a series of resolutions — 2722 of 2024, 2768 and 2787 of 2025 — condemning Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and requiring monthly reporting, but has not authorised binding enforcement measures; deeply divided, with China and Russia abstaining on each resolution.
9. **CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS** — The main multilateral forum negotiating rules on lethal autonomous weapons systems; operating under a mandate that expires at the 2026 CCW Review Conference, with a 2024 UN General Assembly resolution calling for a binding treaty that has not yet materialised.
10. **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)** — Has repeatedly called for new, legally binding international rules on autonomous weapons systems, arguing existing international humanitarian law does not adequately address the loss of human control over the use of force.

Previous Attempts to Address the Threat

1. **IMO Regulatory Scoping Exercise and MASS Code (2018–2026)** — The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee conducted a Regulatory Scoping Exercise (2018–2021) identifying legal gaps affecting autonomous ships across existing safety treaties. This led to a non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships, adopted in May 2026 and in force from July 2026, with a mandatory version not expected until 2028–2032. The Code addresses commercial safety and does not directly regulate autonomous weapons systems.
2. **UN Security Council Resolutions on Red Sea Shipping (2024–2025)** — Resolution 2722 (January 2024) condemned Houthi attacks and demanded their immediate cessation; it has since been followed by



Resolutions 2768 and 2787 extending reporting requirements. None of these resolutions has authorised binding enforcement action, and the Houthis have continued attacks despite them.

3. **Operation Prosperity Guardian, Operation Poseidon Archer, and Operation Aspides** — A US-led multinational coalition (Prosperity Guardian) and a separate US-UK offensive operation (Poseidon Archer) were launched in December 2023 and January 2024 respectively to protect shipping and strike Houthi capabilities; the EU separately launched Operation Aspides, a defensive naval mission. These have reduced but not ended attacks.
4. **CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS** — Ongoing since 2014 under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, these talks have produced eleven guiding principles on autonomous weapons but no binding treaty, hampered by the CCW's consensus-based procedure, which allows a single objecting state to block progress.
5. **UN General Assembly Resolution on Autonomous Weapons Systems (2024)** — Mandated a UN Secretary-General report gathering the views of states and other stakeholders on autonomy in weapons systems and called for progress toward a binding instrument, but implementation has lagged, with civil society groups noting the lack of movement at the CCW.
6. **NATO Baltic Sentry Mission (2025–present)** — A regional deterrence and monitoring mission using frigates, patrol aircraft, and naval drones to protect undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea following a string of suspected sabotage incidents; has increased vessel inspections but has not yet produced a successful prosecution.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

- How should international law classify autonomous and remotely operated maritime vessels — as ships, warships, or a new legal category — and what obligations and immunities should attach to each classification?
- What mechanisms can improve attribution of attacks and sabotage carried out using autonomous systems or vessels with obscured ownership, and what consequences should follow once attribution is established?
- Should there be binding restrictions or a moratorium on the use of fully autonomous lethal maritime weapons systems, and if so, what verification mechanisms would make such restrictions enforceable?
- How can the international community protect civilian seafarers and commercial shipping from attacks by both state and non-state actors, including through safe-passage arrangements, information-sharing, and support for affected crews?
- What role should the IMO's MASS Code, the CCW's LAWS talks, and the UN Security Council play relative to one another, and how can duplication or gridlock between these forums be avoided?
- How should responsibility be allocated when non-state actors, such as the Houthis, use autonomous weapons supplied or facilitated by a state — and what obligations does this place on supplier states?
- What protections and rapid-response mechanisms are needed for undersea cables, pipelines, and other critical maritime infrastructure vulnerable to low-cost, hard-to-attribute sabotage?



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